Introduction
This paper examines the underlying complexities that constitute a dilemma for the responsibility to protect in Africa most specifically the Great Lakes Region. I argue that clarifying the meaning and intention of the doctrine in any given context is predicated on understanding the distinct and complex environment in which the doctrine is invoked. These complexities and their differentiation on a case by case basis construe the doctrine as progressive; with political, legal and moral significance making it fit for its purpose. On the other hand, the variation of prevention and protection amounts to the denunciation of it as being selective, complicit, inconsistent and even imperialistic.
Proponents of R2P confront a major gap between the ideals propounded by the doctrine and realities that have continued to more often than not negate those ideals making them utopic. A comprehensive contextualization should be the basis of determining the prospect, relevance and success of R2P in the great lakes where the need to protect humanity is at crossroad with the complex environment in which the doctrine applies. The analysis focus on the dilemma hinged on a multi-layered security environment creating a predicament for great lakes region, the history and politics of intervention which shapes perspectives and actions and finally effects of global and regional power imbalance.
History and Synopsis of War and Genocide in the Great Lakes Region.
Great Lakes Region consists of countries in East and Central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Uganda), forming a complex network of political and economic interactions with implications on peace, security and governance. At least every generation in these countries has lived either war or genocide which is estimated to have caused approximately 2.5 -4 million deaths. Others have continued to experience the indirect effects of war and genocide reinforcing perception of state fragility and instability.
The conflicts in the region are interlinked, complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking state, non-state, regional and international actors. These conflicts have tended to expand geographically from one country to another; and with a dual character.
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Though current conflicts have a distinct local and/or national anchorage, they are at the same time linked to the political history, global power influence and underlying security dynamics resulting from identity crises, lack of state legitimacy, arms proliferation, regime types, natural resources inter group difference and governance issues. Obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty Sovereignty defined R2P prescribes sovereignty as responsibility. This from the onset creates a problem of misconception that is further engendered by the term 'absolute sovereignty' which rhetorically in the GLR is often interpreted as undermining sovereignty. This is especially evidenced when non military measures such as economic sanctions, judicial approach through the ICC and or military interventions are under consideration. These rhetorics however are often contradictory depending on the anticipated end result; ie, in pursuit of opponents/insurgent groups, such measures are resorted to 'in perceived aid to a weak regime the same is rejected and considered where the source of problem is alleged to be with the regime of the day. 
Security predicament in Africa
The security predicament in Africa specifically the GLR is understood from a historical and comparative analysis of the state, security, and interactions therein. 16 It includes how the concept of security as applied in Africa, differs from its traditional use in the international relations literature; the factors inherent in these states that can help explain this difference; how the interaction of GLR states with the international system affect the security of the former; and the relationship between the security and development concerns of GLR states and most third world states. 17 The overarching aspect is how these interactions affect levels of legitimacy and
social coherence in what Deng terms as a problem of divided nations and cultures whose end result is identity crisis and conflicts. 18 
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The problem therefore is multi layered, at domestic, regional and international level. With interactions going through a series whose timeline is traceable from the historical formation of the African state and flows through arbitral boundary demarcation, colonial legacy of divide and rule; the cold war politics of containment and post-cold war conflicts hence the crisis of legitimacy and lack of social coherence. 19 While traditionally security threats were perceived as emanating from external quarters, post-independence and cold war conflicts in GLR, emerged from internal sources either, the state, opposition and civilians; triggered by internal vulnerabilities characterized by ethnicity, marginalization, identity politics which upon transmutation results to violence and crimes against humanity and acts of genocidal magnitude.
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Coupled with corruption, bad governance and divisive politics, the GLR characterizes antagonistic relations between the elitist regimes and sections of the populations. 21 Making it a 'quasi state', meaning it depends upon international norms to preserve its' sovereign status and not the popular will of its subjects. 22 This 'caricature' state lacks legitimacy and coherence that comes with sovereignty and citizenship envisaged in the Westphalia system. When the material component-that is the popular will is fragmented, it automatically creates a fragile composition which conceptually does not affect sovereignty but in practice undermines its very essence.
States within the Great lakes region depicts a lack of popular will, which may be interpreted to mean no responsibility to the greater masses, save for the section of the society that it enjoys that legitimacy or coherence and identifiable through ethnicity, culture, religion and in the modern day, class. 23 This is the first dilemma that R2P as a protective norm has to contend with. How can responsibility be reinforced by a state whose legitimacy is time and again contested by sections of its population. Essentially it calls for the sovereign to institute that legitimacy and coherence that is plausible through a state-making process.
Today, regimes in GLR are still struggling to reconcile the duty of state-making alongside human and political rights. Competing pull and push factors associated with the two amounts to internal conflicts that pave way for either indiscriminate repression or state failure. Relatively, the former clashes with international norms and may amount to a systematic segregation of population through political, social and economic strategies. In the short term, this breeds stability with a higher probability of outburst which tends to undo all the gains made and eventually may lead to state collapse. From this, streams systematic threats of political, social and economic nature with potential to explode to genocidal level owing to their grievous implications on the population as employed by regimes. For Mamdani, (whether these actions are termed as genocide, war crime, counter insurgency or war against terror they inflict suffering and pain to humanity but the politics of naming that applies on Africa and other developing countries based on power determines what amounts to a threat or mass atrocity and what action can be taken.
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On the contrary, a systematic repression over a long period of time can consolidate legitimacy foster development and posterity of a nation. This, however, is unacceptable in the 21 st century and so depending on the limits of a society, each continues to struggle to get the right strategy of consolidating its legitimacy. Thus, the measures of prevention and protection prescribed by R2P while seeking to address these challenges remain elusive because such reconstruction has not been defined to address these underlying divisions and incoherence in states. The irresponsible states remain subject to internal threats and coercive intervention by the international community. They are a point of reference on sanctions, prosecutorial measures and military interventions. Ultimately, these do not comprehensively address the security threats and impending atrocities but breeds auxiliary discordance amongst the population. This is because preventive and protective measures of R2P tend to assume some form of uniformity which
Deadline and labeling of African states
should not be the case if the doctrine is to function objectively and successfully. While it is preferable for the norm to be consistent and uniformly applied, the realities of African states cannot accord this opportunity because on one hand this uniformity will defeat the purpose of prevention and protection, and on the other hand it may end up distorting the notion of peace, justice and democracy-whose meaning is distinct from one society to another. For these reasons R2P interventions in these cases should be determined on their own merit. In political terms the alleged 'right to intervene' or 'duty to protect', has been interpreted as a language of power and of resistance to some power or authority. Thus a right to protect becomes an antithesis for a duty or responsibility where practically it is the powerful states that assume the right and responsibility over the weak states.
History and politics of intervention
36 Weiss (2004) Chomsky (2011), p. 7 Unlike humanitarian intervention, the doctrine of R2P is founded on a logical flow of order in the global system. However, in an imperfect and realism world, the politics of survival based on While historically all interventions have been qualified on the basis of protection, the wordings and principles of R2P are seen to apply quite generally, meaning it can be interpreted to mean just anything for the consumer. Its limitation to mass atrocities crimes and limitless measures of prevention and reaction is open to ambiguity, mischief and abuse. This equates the doctrine to three historical principles. One is the maxim of Thucydides where the strong do as they wish while the weak suffer as they must, illustrated by the Melian dialogue. 44 Here, the strong refers to the Security Council, its allies and developed states while the weak refers to the 'irresponsible' non allied and alleged rogue states. The end result "hegemonial approach where the voice of the powerful sets precedents.
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The second general principle that pits states against R2P is founded on Adam Smith's account of policy making in England. 46 The principal architects of policy -that is merchants and manufactures ensured that their own interest are most peculiarly met, however grievous the consequences were on the people of England. UN Charter (1945) 14
In most instances, crisis situations have been determined through subjective political processes that protect the status quo and not necessarily the interests of a population. Evidently in the GLR with multiplicity of actors, at disparity, have a variation of weight depending on powers and interests involved. For example, the AU, EAC has been at the forefront, of diplomacy in R2P situations in Burundi, UN, AU, SADC, and individual states have made several attempts in the DRC, both which have resulted to mixed bag of results touching on legitimacy, credibility as defined by would be interveners.
On prosecutorial means the doctrine has been invoked selectively. Militarily, authorization has to be sort from the UNSC wit financial limitations to support the missions. Overdependence on donor agencies whose priorities are increasingly relative are varied and institution/states are swayed to make determinations favorable to its donors and big powers as opposed to the core interest on humanity; where in realism morality of the prince is judged not by his actions to humanity, within the international system but his capacity to pursue national interest and state survival. 60 Thus where mutual relations of states and organization are predicated on mutual benefits interventions are likely to be face saving and not protection of suffering populations. These imbalances create a problem of selectivity and double standards where credibility and legitimacy is subject to continuous scrutiny and contestation.
60 Machiavelli (1513), Chapter. VIII
Conclusion
These three factors characterize the R2P dilemma not only in Africa but internationally. From this expose', one is left to wonder whether it is possible to define, redefine and confine the doctrine to fit into the context of each situation without being seen as inconsistent.
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While such ideals should be uniform in interpretation and application, a propitious meaning and clarity of the doctrine is only attainable if it meets the purpose which is to protect suffering populations from atrocities thus different contexts necessitate a variation of action. Notably, consistency and uniformity can only arise if states are at parity which is impractical in the near future. States will seek to survive in this complex international system and those with economic and military advantage will remain at the forefront in protection, prevention and rebuilding. Despite the need for reforms in the Security Council, protection of civilian population necessitates more effectiveness and legitimacy as opposed to additional numbers which do not guarantee political and moral resolve for protection.
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